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Abstract. The European Union has been one of the major drivers of
the development of renewable energy. The energy policies of most Euro-
pean countries have involved subsidized tariffs, such as the feed-in tariff
in Portugal, the regulated tariff and the market price plus premium in
Spain, and the Renewables Obligation in UK, that came into effect in
2002. Recently, UK has made some reforms and started to consider con-
tracts for difference (CfDs) as a key element of the energy policy. This
paper presents a support policy based on CfDs and bilateral negotiation.
The first phase consists in a CfD auction and the second phase involves
a bilateral negotiation between a Government and each of the selected
investors. The paper also presents a case-study to analyze the potential
benefits of the support policy. It was performed with the help of the
MATREM system. The preliminary results indicate some advantages for
the Government (and, in some cases, for the investors as well).
Keywords: Energy markets, renewable energy, contracts for difference, feed-in
tariffs, price risk, MATREM system.
1 Introduction
The energy industry has evolved into a liberalized industry in which market
forces drive the price of electricity. Three markets models have been distin-
guished [1, 2]: pools, bilateral contracts and hybrid models. A pool is defined as
a centralized marketplace that clears the market for buyers and sellers. Market
entities submit offers for the quantities of power that they are willing to trade.
These offers are handled by a market operator, whose function is to coordi-
nate and manage the transactions between market entities. Bilateral contracts
are agreement between two parties to trade electrical energy. The hybrid model
combines several features of the previous two models.
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There are various types of contractual arrangements that fall under the broad
heading of bilateral contracts, notably contracts for difference (CfDs). Such con-
tracts are bilateral agreements to provide a specific amount of energy for a fixed
price, referred to as the strike price. Also, CfDs are typically indexed to a ref-
erence price, which is often the centralized market-clearing price. In some cases,
CfDs can be one way contracts, when the difference payments are made by one
of the parties only [3, 4].
The evolution of renewable energy has increased substantially over the past
decade. Europe has been at the forefront of the renewable energy policy design
and deployment [5, 6]. In particular, Portugal has benefited from a feed-in tariff
[7]. In Spain, two different types of retribution have been considered: the reg-
ulated or feed-in tariff and the market price plus premium. In UK, there have
been two main policy instruments: the Non-Fossil Fuel Order, a centralized bid-
ding system that ran from 1990 to 1998, and the Renewables Obligation, that
came into effect in 2002. Recently, UK has made some reforms to meet the chal-
lenges of the electricity sector. Contracts for difference are a key element of such
reforms—they are essentially private law contracts between low carbon electric-
ity generators and a Government-owned company. CfDs provide long-term price
stabilisation to low carbon plants, allowing investment to come forward at a
lower cost of capital and therefore at a lower cost to consumers [8, 9].
Renewable generation is characterized by high fixed capital costs but near-
zero variable production costs, and a great dependence on weather conditions.
These characteristics may significantly influence the behavior and outcomes of
energy markets. In particular, high levels of renewable generation may reduce
market prices due to their low-bid costs, and increase price volatility because of
their increased variability and uncertainty [11].
Against this background, this paper presents a study to investigate the poten-
tial benefits of both contracts for difference and bilateral negotiation as a basis
of a renewable energy support policy. It considers a particular Government (e.g.,
the Portugal or Spain Governments) that makes a public announcement of new
investment in wind energy involving two phases. The first phase consists in a CfD
auction, like the UK CfD auctions [8, 10], when the investors make their offers.
This phase is simulated by considering a contract net protocol. The Government
selects all the offers that provide a specific level of benefit and comply with the
requirements. In the second phase, there is a bilateral negotiation between the
Government and each of the selected investors, where the parties negotiate a
mutually acceptable value for the strike price. Negotiation involves an iterative
exchange of proposals and counter-proposals. The study is conducted with the
help of an agent-based tool, called MATREM [12, 13].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of the markets supported by the MATREM system, placing emphasis on
the bilateral marketplace for negotiating long-term contracts (notably contracts
for difference). Section 3 discusses some aspects of the formalization of bilateral
negotiation involving CfDs. Section 4 presents the case-study and discusses the
experimental results. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in section 5.
2 MATREM: Overview of the Bilateral Marketplace
MATREM (for Multi-Agent TRading in Electricity Markets) is an energy man-
agement tool for simulating liberalized electricity markets. The tool supports
a day-ahead market, a shorter-term market (an intra-day market), a balanc-
ing market, a futures market, and a bilateral marketplace. Market entities are
modeled as software agents equipped with models of individual and social be-
haviour, enabling them to be pro-active (i.e., capable of exhibiting goal-directed
behaviour) and social (i.e., able to communicate and negotiate with other agents
in order to complete their design objectives). Currently, the tool supports gen-
erating companies, retailers, aggregators, coalitions of consumers, traditional
consumers, market operators and system operators. A detailed description of
the tool is presented in [12]. A classification of the tool according to various di-
mensions associated with both energy markets and software agents can be found
in [13]. This section gives an overview of the markets supported by the tool,
particularly the bilateral marketplace.
The day-ahead market is a central market where generation and demand
can be traded on an hourly basis [14]. The intra-day market is a short-term
market and involves several auction sessions. Both markets are based on the
marginal pricing theory. The balancing market is a market for primary, secondary
and tertiary reserve. For the particular case of tertiary reserve, two computer
simulations are performed, one for determining the price for up-regulation, and
another for computing the price for down-regulation.
The futures market is an organized market for standardized financial and
physical contracts. Such contracts may span from days to years and typically
hedge against the price risk inherent to day-ahead and intra-day markets. Players
enter orders involving either bids to sell or buy energy in an electronic trading
platform that supports anonymous operation. The platform automatically and
continuously matches the bids likely to interfere with each other.
The bilateral marketplace allows market participants to negotiate all the
details of two different types of tailored (or customized) long-term bilateral con-
tracts, namely forward contracts and contracts for difference (see, e.g., [15]).
Forward bilateral contracts are agreements between two agents to exchange a
specific energy quantity at a certain future time for a particular price. Contracts
for difference are agreements in which each agent ensures the other against dis-
crepancies between the contract price (or strike price) and the market-clearing
price. The terms and conditions of both types of contracts are flexible and can
be negotiated privately to meet the objectives of two parties. To this end, mar-
ket agents are equipped with a model that handles two-party and multi-issue
negotiation [16, 17]. Negotiation proceeds by an iterative exchange of offers and
counter-offers. An offer is a set of issue-value pairs, such as “energy price = 50
e/MWh”, “contract duration = 6 months”, and so on. A counter-offer is an
offer made in response to a previous offer. The bilateral marketplace and the
associated negotiation of long-term contracts represents a novel and powerful
tool. Accordingly, some details about the negotiation process follow.
Let A={a1, a2} be the set of software agents participating in negotiation.
The agent interact according to the rules of an alternating offers protocol [18].
This means that one offer (or proposal) is submitted per time period, with an
agent ai∈A offering in odd periods {1, 3, . . .}, and the other agent aj ∈A offering
in even periods {2, 4, . . .}. The negotiation process starts with ai submitting a
proposal p1i→j to aj at time period t=1. The agent aj receives p
1
i→j and can
either accept it, reject it and opt out of the negotiation, or reject it and continue
bargaining. In the first two cases, negotiation comes to an end. Specifically, if the
proposal is accepted, negotiation ends successfully. Conversely, if the proposal is
rejected and aj decides to opt out, negotiation terminates with no agreement.
In the last case, negotiation proceeds to the next time period t=2, in which
aj makes a counter-proposal p
2
j→i. The agent ai receives the counter-proposal
p2j→i and the tasks just described are repeated, i.e., ai may either accept the
counter-proposal, reject it and opt out of the negotiation, or reject it and continue
bargaining. Negotiation may end with either agreement or no agreement.
Negotiation strategies are computationally tractable functions that define
the negotiation tactics to be used during the course of negotiation. Concession
tactics are functions that generate new values for each issue at stake through-
out negotiation. Let X designate an issue and denote its value at time t by x.
Formally, a concession tactic for X is a function with the following general form:
Y (x ) = x + (−1)m Cf (x−lim) (1)
where m=0 if an agent ai wants to minimize X or m=1 if ai wants to maximize
X, Cf ∈ [0, 1] is the concession factor, and lim is the limit for X (i.e., the point
where ai decides to stop the negotiation rather than to continue, because any
agreement beyond this point is not minimally acceptable). The concession factor
Cf can be a positive constant independent of any objective criteria. Also, Cf can
be modelled as a function of a single criterion. Useful criterion include the total
concession made on each issue throughout negotiation as well as the amount or
quantity of energy for a specific trading period [19].
3 Bilateral Negotiation and Contracts for Difference
As noted, contracts for difference are agreements in which the purchaser pays
the seller the difference between the contract price (or strike price) and some
reference price, usually the market-clearing price. Concretely, CfDs are settled
as follows [1]:
• if the strike price is higher than the market-clearing price, the buyer pays
the seller the difference between these two prices times the energy quantity
agreed;
• conversely, if the strike price is lower than the clearing price, the seller pays
the buyer the difference between these two prices times the quantity of energy
agreed.
In this section, we consider that CfDs may specify the provision of different
quantities of energy for different periods of time, at different prices (see also
[19]). Thus, we consider that the set of negotiating issues includes n strike prices
and n energy quantities. Let Pk be a strike price and Qk an energy quantity (for
k=1, . . . , n). Let pk denote the value of Pk for quantity qk of Qk. Also, let rpk be
the value of a reference price RPk associated with a specific period of a day. The
financial compensation associated with CfDs can now be formalized. Specifically,
when the strike prices are smaller than the reference prices, the amount to pay
is as follows:
Cs =
n∑
k=1
(rpk − pk )× qk (2)
And the amount to pay by buyers to sellers is as follows:
Cb =
n∑
k=1
(pk − rpk )× qk (3)
4 Case-Study
This section analyzes the potential benefits of a renewable energy support pol-
icy involving two phases. The agents are a Government of a particular country
(e.g., Portugal or Spain) and various investors (or renewable energy producers).
The first phase consists in a CfD auction, like the UK CfD auctions, where in-
vestors can make offers, and the Government select the best ones according to
pre-defined requirements. The second phase consists in a private bilateral ne-
gotiation between the Government and each of the selected investors, to obtain
a mutually acceptable value for the strike price. Since each selected investor
knows the first proposal of the other investors, there is the possibility to make a
more competitive offer in this phase. Accordingly, this support policy could be
advantageous for the Government (and, in some cases, for the investors as well).
First Phase: CfD Auction. The public announcement involves the investment
in wind energy in a maximum of 100 MW of installed capacity (per investor).
The investors can propose projects involving less than 100 MW, but only in
group with investors in a similar situation. Joint projects involving more than
100 MW of installed capacity can be accepted, in case they are advantageous
for the Government. All investors should submit the following: strike price (SP),
average expected power factor (PF) of the project, and (iii) installed capacity
(IC). The power factor consists in the average number of hours that wind farms
will be operating at the installed capacity/nominal power.
The points (P) attributed to each proposal are computed by considering the
relation between the strike price and the average expected power factor, as well
as the installed capacity (see Equation 4). The power factor and the strike price
have weights k1 and k2, respectively (such that k1 + k2 = 1). Since SP is often
the most important factor, in this work we consider k1 = 0.3 and k2 = 0.7.
Table 1. CfD auction results: projects accepted for the next phase.
Project Strike price Power factor Installed capacity Points
Id (e/MWh) (%) (MW)
9 74.20 31.90 100.00 18.84
2 73.85 31.90 30.00 18.14
3 75.80 31.30 80.00 18.05
1 73.90 29.50 100.00 17.96
11 75.70 30.20 100.00 17.95
P = 100×
(
k1PF
k2SP
× (1.05− 1−
IC
100
10
)
)
(4)
The CfD auction involved a total of 15 proposals, but only 5 were accepted
for the next phase. Specifically, projects 1, 9 and 11 were accepted as individual
projects, while projects 2 and 3 were accepted as a joint project. This means
that investors of projects 2 and 3 make a strategic alliance to be awarded a CfD
(although their companies remain separated). Table 1 shows the CfD allocation
auction round outcome, with the 5 projects delivering 410 MW of renewable
energy. Several potential projects for the next delivery years did not get awarded
a CfD, which may to some extent raise questions about the viability of the CfD
regime for small and medium enterprises. Probably, a strike price of around 80
e is acceptable, but lower than this could be not workable. Furthermore, the
importance of interest rates in relation to the strike price should not be ignored
in future work, given that the project time line will likely extend into periods of
possible interest rate change which could impact on the viability of any strike
prices.
Second Phase: Private Bilateral Negotiation. After announcing the results
of the CfD auction, the Government starts private bilateral negotiations with
the investors. For projects 1, 9 and 11, negotiation involves the Government
and each of the corresponding investors. Projects 2 and 3 are a joint project,
meaning that negotiation involves the Government and the agent representing
the joint project. A detailed description of the negotiation process between the
Government and the investor responsible for project 9 follows.
Negotiation proceeds through two main phases: a beginning or initiation
phase (pre-negotiation) and a middle or problem-solving phase (actual negoti-
ation). Pre-negotiation involves the creation of a well-conceived plan specifying
the issues at stake, the limits and targets, the attitude toward risk and an appro-
priate strategy. In this work, the negotiating agenda involves mainly the strike
price. The limit or resistance point is the point where each party decides to stop
the negotiation rather than to continue. The target point is the point where each
negotiator realistically expects to achieve an agreement. We consider that the
Government adopts a risk-seeking attitude. Thus, assuming the existence of a
number of interested investors, the Government can adopt an aggressive posi-
tion throughout negotiation in searching for a good deal. The investor adopts a
risk-averse attitude, acting carefully to achieve a deal and award a CfD. Both
parties adopt concession strategies, meaning that they are willing to partially
reduce their demands to accommodate the opponent.
Actual negotiation involves an iterative exchange of offers and counter-offers.
The investor makes an opening offer involving the strike price shown in Table 1
(74.20 e/MWh). The Government may be pleased with such an offer, but might
still believe that there is room for a few concessions. Accordingly, the Govern-
ment responds with an offer involving a strike price lower than the received
price, lets say 72.50 e/MWh. After these two offers, the parties may argue for
what they want, but at a certain point they recognize the importance of moving
toward agreement. Thus, and despite the fact of being reluctant to make any con-
cession, the investor slightly reduces the strike price. The Government decides to
respond in kind and mirror the concession of the investor. And the agents enter
into a negotiation dance, exchanging proposals and counter-proposals, until they
reach the final price of 73.37 e/MWh. This price represents a good deal for the
Government and an acceptable deal for the investor, who will be awarded with
a contract for difference for the next 15 years.
5 Conclusion
This article has presented an energy support policy based on contracts for differ-
ence and bilateral negotiation. The support policy involves two phases. The first
consists in a CfD auction, like the UK auctions, and the second involves a pri-
vate bilateral negotiation between each of the selected investors and a particular
Government.
Preliminary results from a case-study indicate some advantageous for the
Government (and, in some cases, for the investors as well). In the future, we
intend to perform a number experiments, using controlled experimentation as
the experimental method, to evaluate the effectiveness of the support policy in
a number of different situations.
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